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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
RALPH LEROY MENZIES, : Case No. 880161 
Priority No. 1 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction, Statement of the 
Issues and Standards of Review, Statement of the Case, and Statement 
of the Facts are contained in Appellant's opening brief at 1-15. 
Mr. Menzies relies on those statements and makes the following brief 
replies. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The State is incorrect that the federal and state 
constitutional issues raised in this appeal were not raised below 
and are therefore subject to a plain error standard. See State's 
brief at 2. The arguments that use of this transcript would violate 
the state and federal constitution were some of the bases for 
Mr. Menzies' Motion for New Trial. R. 1223-5; 1237-49; 1630-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Judge Uno's order does not "certify" the original 
transcript. Instead, it states: 
The original transcript, prepared by the 
notereader, shall be transmitted to the Utah 
Supreme Court based upon the finding that despite 
numerous errors, the original transcript is 
sufficiently accurate to afford a full and fair 
review of his issues to be raised on appeal. 
See Order contained in Addendum E to Appellant's opening brief. 
Judge Uno also transmitted the "California transcript" to this Court 
as part of the record on appeal. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In addition to the facts outlined in Mr. Menzies' opening 
brief, Mr. Menzies outlines the following facts. 
The suggestion by the State that Ms. Lee was a temporary 
reporter disregards all of the evidence in Ms. Lee's personnel file 
that she was appointed as the official reporter for Judge Uno to 
replace Bob Lewis. See Defendant's Exhibit 3; see also discussion 
infra at 6-8. 
Although the Court Administrator's office did make an 
arrangement with Ms. Lee whereby she was placed on leave with pay 
during alternate weeks to complete this transcript (R. 1166:69), 
nothing in the record suggests that the Court Administrator's office 
knew of or condoned the extensive role played by the notereader and 
proofreader in the preparation of the transcript. See Defendant's 
Exhibit 3; R. 1166:69, 70; Addendum J to Appellant's opening brief. 
Ron Gibson made special arrangements whereby Ms. Lee was permitted 
to work at home based on Ms. Lee's representation that she needed to 
use her computer at home to prepare the Menzies transcripts. 
R. 1166:77. 
According to Ms. Lee, during those five weeks of full-time 
leave, the only effort she made toward preparation of the 
transcripts was to read portions of pages to which the notereader 
had attached a paperclip. R. 1166:173-7. She did not type, 
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proofread, correct, or otherwise prepare the transcripts. 
Although Ms. Lee was terminated for a number of reasons, 
problems with the Menzies case are mentioned several times in her 
personnel file, and she was relieved of her responsibility in 
Judge Uno's courtroom in order to complete the Menzies transcripts. 
See Defendants Exhibit 3. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court Reporters and Stenographers Act, Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing Act, Code of Judicial 
Administration, Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code Ann. 
section 76-3-206(2) mandate that a transcript prepared by an 
individual who is not certified cannot be used as the official 
record for appellate purposes unless the parties so stipulate. 
Speculation as to whether Ms. Lee was qualified and/or would have 
been licensed had she applied is irrelevant where she was not in 
fact certified. 
Assuming, arguendo, that a transcript prepared by a 
noncertified individual can be used as the official record, the 
State nevertheless has the burden of establishing the accuracy of 
such a transcript. Regardless, however, of which party has the 
burden, the overwhelming evidence of errors and incompetency in this 
case establishes that the transcript is not adequate for appellate 
review. Where an inadequate record exists, no showing of specific 
harm is required. 
Significant errors causing prejudice exist throughout this 
record. 
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Mr. Menzies raised a distinct analysis under the state 
constitution in the trial court which this Court should address on 
appeal. 
The prosecutor's ex parte statement in the record violates 
the state and federal constitutions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. UTAH STATUTES AND RULES PRECLUDE THE 
USE OF A TRANSCRIPT PREPARED BY ANYONE OTHER THAN 
A CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER AS THE OFFICIAL 
RECORD ON APPEAL. 
Rule 3-305, Utah Code of Judicial Administration(1988) 
provides: 
(10) Except as otherwise agreed, pursuant to 
written stipulation and approval of the court, 
transcripts prepared by anyone other than a 
certified court transcriber shall not be used as 
the official record of the court proceedings for 
any purpose required by state statute, rule or 
provision of this Code. 
This rule1 echoes Mr. Menzies7 argument in Point I of his 
opening brief that the Court Reporters and Stenographers Act ("the 
Act"), the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing Act 
("the Licensing Act"), Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-3-206(2) mandate that a transcript prepared by an 
1. The Code of Judicial Administration was initially adopted in 
October, 1988, after a committee spent over two years putting the 
Code together; "[t]he Code consolidates into a single publication 
all of the administrative rules and rules of practice which have 
previously been adopted by the Judicial Council, the Boards of 
Judges and the local courts and the rules of professional practice 
which have been adopted by the Supreme Court." Introduction, Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration (1988), p. vii; see also Foreward, 
p. v. Hence, the Code of Judicial Administration did not create new 
rules; instead, it consolidated previously adopted rules. 
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individual who is not certified cannot be used as the official 
record in a capital homicide case unless the parties so stipulate. 
The State argues that the Act makes a distinction between 
shorthand reporters and certified shorthand reporters, thereby 
implying that noncertified reporters may appropriately act as 
district court reporters under the Act. State's Brief at 9-11. This 
argument fails to consider the Act as a whole. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-56-15 requires that "[n]o person shall be appointed to the 
position of shorthand reporter nor act in that capacity in any 
district court . . . unless he has received a certificate from the 
Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing . . . " 
(emphasis added). Hence, the Act envisions that all persons acting 
as court reporters in district courts will be properly licensed. 
The State also argues that "[i]f the qualifications [of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-16(1987)] are met, the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing does not appear to have any 
discretion about granting the certificate." State's Brief at ll.2 
This statement ignores the fact that the qualifications set forth in 
§ 78-56-15 are broad, giving the Division discretion in assessing 
whether the qualifications are themselves met. 
As outlined in Mr. Menzies opening brief at 30-31, had 
2. The State seems to imply by this statement that Ms. Lee would 
have automatically been certified in Utah if she had applied, and 
that her lack of certification therefore does not matter. Not only 
is the assumption that Ms. Lee would have been automatically 
certified incorrect (see Appellant's opening brief at 29-32), the 
statement also ignores the importance of licensing and regulation in 
professions where education, skill and knowledge are required. 
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Ms. Lee applied for certification, the Division, in all likelihood, 
would have determined that she did not possess the moral character 
or skill and ability necessary to act as a district court reporter. 
In addition, Mr. Menzies directs this Court's attention to the 
Accusation contained in Addendum I of his opening brief which 
demonstrates that in January, 1988, Ms. Lee was delinquent in 
filing transcripts in California. Had either the Division or Court 
Administrator's office conducted a background check on Ms. Lee, they 
would have ascertained this information and either not licensed 
and/or not hired Ms. Lee. 
The State also suggests that Ms. Lee did not need to be 
certified because she was a temporary reporter, claiming that she 
was appointed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17. However, the 
evidence in this case establishes that Ms. Lee was appointed as the 
official reporter for Judge Uno and was not in a temporary 
capacity.3 Ron Gibson, deputy court administrator, testified on 
direct examination by Mr. Menzies' attorney that Ms. Lee was 
appointed as the official court reporter for Judge Uno. 
R. 1166:29. Nothing in Ms. Lee's personnel file or the nature of 
her employment suggest that she was hired in a temporary capacity; 
in addition, a "regularly appointed certified shorthand reporter" 
for Judge Uno who had neither been removed from the job or who was 
3. Judge Uno did not make a specific finding as to whether Ms. Lee 
was a temporary or permanent reporter. His determination that 
Ms. Lee was qualified to act as court reporter implies, however, 
that she was appointed as the official reporter and was not acting 
in a temporary capacity. 
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suffering from a temporary disability, as required to trigger Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-56-17, did not exist.4 
4. The letters and memoranda contained in Ms. Lee's personnel file 
repeatedly refer to her as the official court reporter. See 
Defendant's Exhibit 3, Tauni Lee's personnel file and documents 
therein, e.g. letter to clerk of First District Court of Appeals in 
California, contained in Addendum A to this brief (indicating that 
Ms. Lee "is currently serving as an official reporter in a District 
Court in Utah"); Memorandum dated May 24, 1988, contained in 
Addendum B to this brief (appointing temporary reporter to fill in 
for Ms. Lee while Ms. Lee was on sick leave for broken finger). 
In addition, Ms. Lee's position did not terminate in June, 
the date of the next examination, as required by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-56-17. 
Ms. Lee was appointed to replace Bob Lewis, who resigned to 
take a position in federal district court and was not on temporary 
leave or removed, as required to trigger Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17. 
See Addendum C to this brief. 
When questioned by the State, Ron Gibson testified that he 
knew Ms. Lee was not licensed in Utah, but believed that she had a 
valid California license. He testified further that he determined 
that she could be appointed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17. 
R. 1166:82-3, 87. Mr. Gibson is not a lawyer; rather, he is an 
administrator for the Court Administrator's office. His incorrect 
interpretation of a statute does not bind this Court. In addition, 
(footnote continued) 
his interpretation was based on incorrect information that Ms. Lee 
was properly licensed in California. R. 1166:87. 
Furthermore, Mr. Gibson's statements regarding the 
licensing status of Ms. Lee have not been consistent. In November, 
1989, when Mr. Menzies file his Motion for New Trial, Mr. Gibson 
told the press that Ms. Lee had been properly licensed in Utah. 
R. 1166:33. He testified on direct examination during the new trial 
proceedings that she was the official reporter for Judge Uno 
(R. 1166:29); his memoranda and treatment of her demonstrate that 
she was a permanent, official reporter and not a temporary one. See 
personnel file, Defendant's Exhibit 3. He also testified that he 
became familiar with Ms. Lee in May, 1988, three months after she 
was hired, and that he did not play a role in hiring her. 
R. 1166:29-30. His conflicting statement that he told the district 
court clerk that she could be used as a temporary reporter 
(R. 1166:82-3) is the only suggestion by Mr. Gibson, the personnel 
file, or anyone involved with Ms. Lee's appointment, that Ms. Lee 
was appointed as a temporary reporter. 
Nevertheless, even if the Court Administrator's office had 
believed Ms. Lee could be appointed as a temporary reporter without 
obtaining a Utah license, such belief was erroneous since the Act 
(footnote continued) 
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The state misreads Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-17 (1953 as 
amended) when it suggests that section 17 permits uncertified 
persons to act as court reporters. Utah Code Ann. § 78-56-15 
requires that anyone acting as a court reporter be certified; 
section 17 merely allows persons to sit as temporary reporters 
without going through an official appointment process, and limits 
the duration of such temporary appointment until the next regularly 
scheduled examination. 
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 58-1-13 (1953 as amended) 
provides for temporary licensure for persons who have "met all 
license requirements except the passing of an examination". When 
the Licensing Act is read together with the Act, it is apparent that 
temporary shorthand reporters must have a temporary license to 
properly act in that capacity. 
The State also relies on Rule 3-304(2)(A), Code of Judicial 
Administration in support of its argument that all shorthand 
reporters need not be certified. The State is correct that Rule 
3-304(2)(A) states: 
All official court reporters and substitute 
reporters serving in the district courts shall be 
licensed in the State of Utah as certified 
shorthand reporters by the Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing of the 
Department of Commerce. Pursuant to Council 
guidelines, the court administrator may authorize 
exceptions to this required qualification in the 
event that certified shorthand reporters are not 
available or an official court reporter or a 
(footnote 4 continued) 
expressly requires that all persons acting as court reporters be 
licensed in Utah. See discussion supra at 5. 
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graduate of an accredited court reporting school 
is deemed competent, but is not licensed for 
reasons unrelated to satisfactory performance as 
an official court reporter as provided herein. 
This rule was not included in the initial Code of Judicial 
Administration adopted in 1988, and appeared for the first time in 
the 1990 version. The timing of the adoption of this rule and the 
notoriety of the facts in the present case suggest that the 
difficulties regarding Ms. Lee's tenure may well have triggered the 
adoption of the rule.5 
More importantly, however, Rule 3-304(2)(A) when read in 
conjunction with the previously existing Rule 3-305 requires that 
the parties stipulate to the use of an uncertified reporter in order 
to use her work as the official record of proceedings. Hence, even 
if Rule 3-304 were in existence at the time of this trial and 
applicable under the circumstances of this case, the transcript 
would not be useable as an official record of proceedings. 
The State fails to distinguish any of the cases cited by 
Mr. Menzies in support of his argument in Point I of his brief that 
a transcript prepared by a noncertified person cannot be used for 
5. Even if this rule had been in effect at the time Ms. Lee was 
appointed as Judge Uno's reporter, there is no showing in the 
present case that the court administrator followed council 
guidelines in authorizing an exception to the rule or in appointing 
Ms. Lee. Nor is there any showing that licensed individuals were 
not available. When Ms. Lee broke her finger less than six months 
after being appointed, a temporary replacement was appointed. The 
Court Administrator's office could have utilized the same procedure 
in initially filling the position that it did in placing the 
temporary. See Memorandum dated May 24, 1988 contained in 
Addendum B to this brief. Although Ron Gibson testified that 
Ms. Lee was the only applicant, there is no evidence as to how long 
a vacancy existed or what efforts were made to fill the position. 
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appellate review. See, e.g.. Appellant's opening brief at 20 citing 
In re David T.. 127 Cal. Rptr. 729 (Cal. 4th 1976); Pullan v. 
Fulbriaht. 685 S.W.2d 151 (Ark. 1985). Nor does the State cite any 
cases from Utah or other jurisdictions in support of its argument 
that certification is not necessary. 
Finally, although the State argues in Point I that even 
though Ms. Lee was not certified, an official record exists in this 
case, it fails to address which version of the transcript it 
believes to be the "official" record.6 If this Court were to accept 
the State's argument that Ms. Lee need not be certified, it would 
then have to determine whether the version of the transcript which 
was prepared by a noncertified notereader and proofreader or the 
significantly different "California" version is the official record 
in this case. Since Ms. Lee did not prepare nor read the original 
version, there is no basis for including that as the official 
record. On the other hand, the "California" version contains 
numerous portions which are unintelligible and the parties and trial 
judge agree that it does not make sense in certain areas. 
R. 1932:27, 30, 45-6, 47, 55, 58, 62, 66; see Appellant's opening 
brief at 33-4. 
Judge Uno's ruling that although Ms. Lee "was not licensed 
6. In its Statement of the Case at 4, the State claims that 
"Judge Uno ordered that the original transcript be certified to this 
Court for review of defendant's case." But see Appellant's 
Statement of the Case supra at 1-2. This claim by the State in its 
Statement of the Case is the only suggestion throughout the State's 
brief as to which version of the transcript it believes should be 
used as the official record in this case. 
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as a court reporter, she was qualified to report this trial" 
(R. 1186:5) is meaningless under the statutes and rules which make 
certification in Utah a necessary requisite to using a transcript 
prepared by a reporter. Furthermore, as extensively outlined by 
Mr. Menzies in his opening brief at 30-32, such a position is not 
supported by the evidence in this case. 
Because Ms. Lee was not certified, an official record of 
the proceedings does not exist in this case. 
POINT II. MANDATORY REVIEW OF THIS CAPITAL 
HOMICIDE CASE IS IMPOSSIBLE SINCE AN ACCURATE, 
VERBATIM RECORD DOES NOT EXIST. 
Although Mr. Menzies maintains that a transcript "prepared" 
by an individual who is not a certified shorthand reporter cannot be 
used as the official record in this case, in the event this Court 
disagrees, Mr. Menzies argues, alternatively, that (1) the State 
must establish the accuracy of the transcript, and (2) regardless of 
which party has the burden, the overwhelming evidence in the instant 
case establishes that the transcript is inaccurate and unacceptable 
for appellate review. 
A. THE STATE HAS THE BURDEN OF ESTABLISHING THE 
ACCURACY OF THE TRANSCRIPT. 
The State relies solely on Rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure in support of its argument that Mr. Menzies has the burden 
of establishing the inaccuracy of the transcript. However, Rule 11 
contemplates that any transcript will be prepared by a certified 
shorthand reporter. In addition, while Rule 11 can assist in 
repairing some transcripts, the rule does not discuss nor resolve a 
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situation such as the present one where a lengthy and detailed 
capital homicide trial occurred, the parties cannot recall details, 
and the parties are unable to agree as to what transpired. 
Furthermore, Rule 11 does not expressly assign a burden to 
either party; rather, it directs the trial court to settle and 
correct the record. Nor did this Court assign a burden in State v. 
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), or Emia v. Hayward, 703 P.2d 1043 
(Utah 1985). 
State v. Perry, 136 Wis.2d 92, 401 N.W.2d 748, 757 (1987), 
supports Mr. Menzies' argument that the State has the burden of 
establishing the accuracy of this disputed transcript. The Perry 
court stated: 
[T]he transcript must be established in 
accordance with the burden of proof required in 
the case, i.e., in a criminal case, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If the court cannot reach that 
degree of certainty, it must reverse and order a 
new trial. 
Id. at 753. 
In focusing solely on Rule 11, the State ignores Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-56-6 and the presumption created therein. See Appellant's 
opening brief at 22. The State also ignores Utah case law which 
requires that "proof of the accuracy of the transcript" be supplied 
in order to use it on appeal. Flannery v. Flannery, 536 P.2d 136 
(Utah 1975); State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983). 
Where an unlicensed individual prepares a transcript, the 
State has the burden of proving the accuracy of the transcript in 
order to use it as the official record on appeal. In the present 
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case, where the State presented almost no evidence regarding the 
accuracy of the transcript, it has failed to sustain that burden. 
B. NEITHER VERSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT IS 
SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE "MEANINGFUL APPELLATE 
REVIEW" IN THIS CASE. 
Even if this Court were to place the burden on Mr. Menziesf 
the abundant evidence regarding Ms. Lee's lack of knowledge and 
skill, along with the numerous errors and inaccuracies/ establish 
that neither transcript is adequate for appellate review. 
The State acknowledges that numerous errors occur 
throughout the transcripts, but claims that such errors do not 
require a new trial since Mr. Menzies is not guaranteed a "perfect 
transcript." In its attempt to minimize the seriousness of the 
errors and inaccuracies, the State fails to address all of the 
errors and problems raised by Mr. Menzies, along with the overall 
unreliability of either version of the transcript, and fails to 
acknowledge the importance of a transcript which assures meaningful 
appellate review. In light of the gravity of the offense and 
severity of the penalty in the present case, meaningful appellate 
review is precluded by the inaccurate and inadequate transcription. 
See State v. Sanders, 321 S.E.2d 836, 837 (N.C. 1984) (per curiam) 
(reversing capital homicide conviction and sentence under court's 
supervisory powers and in the interests of justice where "meaningful 
appellate review . . . is completely precluded by the entirely 
inaccurate and inadequate transcription . . . " ) . 
In State v. Perry, 401 N.W.2d at 751, cited by the State on 
pages 15, 17, and 18 of its brief, the court emphasized the 
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importance of a full transcript which, "beyond a reasonable doubt, 
portrays in a way that is meaningful to the particular appeal 
exactly what happened in the course of the trial." Id. The Perry 
court explicitly acknowledged the importance of an accurate record 
for assessing both errors raised at trial and plain error. Id. at 
754. In reversing the defendants convictions, the court pointed 
out that "[t]he usual remedy where the transcript deficiency is such 
that there cannot be a meaningful appeal is reversal with directions 
that there be a new trial (citations omitted)." Id. 
State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439 (Utah 1983), supports 
Mr. Menzies' argument that the transcript in this case is not 
sufficient for meaningful appellate review. Taylor suggests that 
where significant portions of the transcript are inaudible, 
unintelligible or uncertain, criminal convictions must be reversed 
for a new trial. 
State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 
804 P.2d 1232 (1990), provides little guidance for this Court since 
the factual scenario is different. Jonas was a noncapital case, the 
effect of lack of certification of the reporter was not considered, 
and decisions from the court of appeals do not control this Court.7 
7. In Jonas, the appellant attacked only a small portion of the 
transcript. Ms. Lee substituted for the regular reporter for a 
portion of a day in a trial which lasted several days. Ms. Lee 
disappeared without preparing the requested transcript; a different 
reporter obtained Ms. Lee's notes and prepared the contested 
transcript. The "(illegible)" notation in Jonas refers to Ms. Lee's 
notes taken in that case. 
Counsel for Mr. Jonas was not aware that Ms. Lee was not 
certified and that issue was not raised for the trial court or court 
(footnote continued) 
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State v, Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), also offers 
very little guidance in the instant case.8 In Moosman, the 
deficiency in the transcript involved a single hearing which had not 
been transcribed, and did not permeate the entire record. A limited 
aspect of the hearing was at issue—whether the defendant had been 
present and waived his right to a jury trial. The prosecutor and 
apparently the judge remembered that the hearing had occurred where 
the defendant was present and waived his right to a jury. The 
surrounding circumstances in the case supported such a finding. By 
contrast, in the present case, the errors permeate the entire 
transcript prepared by Ms. Lee and the parties are unable to 
adequately reconstruct the details of the proceedings of each day. 
See generally State v. Sanders, 321 S.E.2d at 837. 
The State argues that the transcript should be used because 
the errors could be fixed or are inconsequential.9 State's Brief at 
(footnote 7 continued) 
of appeals in Jonas. Nor was any other evidence introduced in Jonas 
regarding Ms. Lee's licensing problems in California, her inability 
to take down or read notes, or her lack of qualifications and moral 
fitness. The only issue regarding the transcript presented to the 
court in Jonas was whether the proceedings under Rule 11, Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure utilizing a certified shorthand reporter to 
read the notes of the reporter who was present, provided an adequate 
transcript to address the issues raised in that case. Jonas 
therefore has very little impact on this Court's decision in the 
instant case. 
8. Although Moosman involved a capital homicide charge, the 
defendant was not sentenced to death. Therefore, the heightened 
concerns applicable to death penalty cases were not applicable in 
Moosman. 
9. In making this argument, it is again unclear as to which version 
of the transcript the State is discussing. 
(footnote continued) 
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19, 23-9. First, the State claims that the transcript could have 
been reconstructed through proposed modifications had Mr. Menzies 
accepted all of the State's proposals. State's Brief at 19.10 This 
position is contrary to the stipulation of the parties in the trial 
court that Mr. Menzies had made all reasonable efforts to 
reconstruct this transcript under Rule 11, and that such 
reconstruction was not possible. R. 1932:79. The State's position 
also fails to take into account the fact that this case was in the 
trial court for more than a year while the parties attempted to 
reconstruct the record, and numerous proposed modifications were 
(footnote 9 continued) 
Apparently in support of its argument that the errors are 
inconsequential, the State points out that on November 7, 1990, 
Judge Uno was prepared to certify the transcript to this Court. 
Judge Uno's statement, quoted by the State on page 21 of its brief, 
was made before the judge saw the discrepancies between Ms. Lee's 
notes and the notereader's version, and does not resolve the 
significant added concern regarding the accuracy of the original 
version which is raised by a comparison of that version with 
Ms. Lee's notes. It was also made at a time when the transcripts of 
two hearings, one of which was the penalty phase discovery hearing 
which impacts directly on an issue on appeal, were missing. 
10. The State relies on People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455, 218 P.2d 
769, 773, cert, denied, 340 U.S. 840 (1950), and People v. Chessman, 
52 Cal.2d 467, 341 P.2d 679, 690-2, cert, denied, 361 U.S. 925 
(1959). Both Chessman decisions were written long before the United 
States Supreme Court significantly altered capital punishment in 
this country with its decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 
92 S.Ct. 2716, 33 L.Ed.2d 46 (1972). In addition, Chessman is 
factually distinct from the present case regarding not only the ease 
in reconstruction, but also the fact that notes taken by an 
official, apparently licensed, court reporter existed. More recent 
decisions, such as State v. Sanders, 321 S.E.2d 836, reach a 
different conclusion than that reached in the Chessman decisions. 
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submitted or stipulated to by Mr. Menzies.11 It also fails to 
consider the impracticability of reconstructing an entire trial of 
this length. See Felton v. State, 523 So.2d 775, 776 (Fla. Dist. 
App. 1988) ("Reconstructions of an entire trial are relatively rare 
due to the extreme difficulties in preparing same; people's memories 
of a complex trial involving many witnesses is rarely such that a 
11. Mr. Menzies filed proposed modifications in December 8, 1989. 
On December 13, 1989, he filed a supplement containing further 
proposed modifications. The parties stipulated to numerous changes 
in the transcript early in these proceedings. Mr. Menzies filed a 
renewed Motion to Set Aside Judgment and/or for New Trial on 
November 26, 1990 (R. 1799-1800; 1888-1907), outlining numerous 
areas where the transcript was incorrect. On December 17, 1990, he 
filed additional proposed modifications. R. 1818-1908. Mr. Menzies 
also stipulated to many of the State's proposed changes and 
responded to all of its motions. 
The State suggests that Mr. Menzies did not respond to its 
proposed changes filed on November 30, 1990. State's Brief at 21. 
That proposal contained only two modifications, (1) that the reading 
of the jury verdict be changed to "not guilty" instead of "guilty" 
as reflected in the transcript and (2) that Carlton Way's 
transcription of pages 888-894 be substituted for the transcription 
done by the notereader. Mr. Menzies stipulated to the second 
proposed change, and the transcript prepared by Carlton Way is 
included in this record. The first change outlined by the State in 
it November 30, 1990 motion had already been agreed upon by the 
parties and ordered by the court over a year before the State 
"proposed" the change. 
In addition, on three days' notice, trial counsel traveled 
to California and spent over three weeks with Ms. Lee and a 
representative of the State going over Ms. Lee's notes; this abrupt 
scheduling was the result of the trial judge changing an order that 
he had renewed on a number of occasions that Ms. Lee travel to Utah 
for the process. The abrupt departure and extensive amount of time 
involved created great hardship for trial counsel and the office of 
trial counsel. 
To now argue that Mr. Menzies has not made every effort to 
reconstruct this transcript flies in the face of the stipulation of 
the parties, the order of the trial judge, and the monumental 
efforts made by defense counsel in this case. 
Furthermore, if modification would cure this transcript, 
the appropriate remedy would be to send it back to the trial court 
for further reconstruction. This is a remedy expressly rejected by 
the State as being counterproductive and too time-consuming. 
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proper record can ever be reconstructed given the passage of 
time."); Hardv v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 280, 11 L.Ed.2d 331, 
84 S.Ct. 424 (1964) ("Recollections and notes of trial counsel and 
of others are apt to be faulty and incomplete."). Finally, the 
State's position fails to take in to account the obvious fact that 
Mr. Menzies is not required to stipulate to a change that he does 
not believe occurred or which he cannot recall. 
The State did not address all of the specific inaccuracies 
raised by Mr. Menzies; nor did it address his concern as to the 
overwhelming inaccuracy and unreliability of these transcripts where 
(1) numerous significant and obvious errors exist in the 
transcripts; (2) Ms. Lee was not certified in Utah nor currently in 
good standing in California; (3) Ms. Lee's work history both 
immediately before and after her tenure in Judge Uno's courtroom 
demonstrated her inability to adequately transcribe proceedings; 
(4) the original transcript was not prepared nor read by Ms. Lee, 
and numerous discrepancies exist between her notes and the 
notereader's version; and (5) Ms. Lee had obvious difficulty in 
taking accurate notes in court. 
In addressing specific errors, the State's approach is to 
attempt to minimize the importance of each individual error without 
ever addressing the effect of the multitude of such errors, the 
impracticality of attempting to modify this transcript, or the 
concerns listed above. For example, the State claims that Ms. Lee's 
failure to take down voir dire answers is permissible since she used 
a symbol which referred her to Judge Uno's "script." This position 
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ignores the fact that the "script" was for Judge Uno's guidance 
only; that he was free to vary the way in which he asked questions; 
and on at least one occasion, which Ms. Lee then erroneously 
reported as the question asked of a number of jurors, Judge Uno 
asked a question in a manner which varied from the "script." 
Judge Uno did not tell Ms. Lee to stop taking notes; there 
is no way of ascertaining whether the judge in fact asked the 
questions since Ms. Lee apparently stopped taking notes. 
The State also claims that Ms. Lee could appropriately use 
asterisks in place of taking down verbatim the trial court's 
admonishments. However, Ms. Lee used asterisks for a multitude of 
occurrences, and in reading the notes, one is left to guess whether 
a particular asterisk was actually an admonishment or some other 
occurrence. In addition, in this high publicity case where one 
juror was contacted by an anonymous caller and informed of 
Mr. Menzies' criminal record (T. 2367), jury admonitions are 
critical. (See, e.g., T. 2369.) Without exact words, the nature of 
the admonishments cannot be ascertained.12 
Use of police reports and the trial judge's notes to 
12. In the Table of Contents contained in Addendum M to Appellant's 
opening brief, an appellate issue regarding the tainting of the jury 
is listed. Mr. Menzies maintains that he was denied his right to 
due process and a fair trial by a fair and impartial jury as the 
result of several occurrences during the course of the trial. 
During the trial, one juror fainted during the medical testimony 
(T. 1622), Ms. Lee became distraught (T. 1633-4), a second juror 
received the anonymous phone call (T. 2369), and a third juror had a 
breakdown in front of the other jurors (T. 2396). The trial judge 
sequestered the jury (T. 394-5), and defense counsel made several 
motions for mistrial based on these irregular occurrences (T. 2369, 
2398-9, 2409-10, 2473). 
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embellish testimony and making up portions of the transcript results 
in an unreliable and unuseable transcript. Attempting to understand 
this transcript in context is difficult since it is lengthy and 
requires reliance on other unreliable portions of transcript; it is 
also time consuming and subject to various interpretations, as 
evidenced by the hearing on December 19, 1990. 
The State also attempts to minimize the unintelligible and 
erroneous portions of argument by arguing that this Court will 
review this transcript regardless of whether an objection is made. 
The fallacy of this argument is apparent on page 2 of the State's 
brief where it asserts that this Court should review the 
constitutional arguments which Mr. Menzies raised in the trial court 
for plain error only. See also State's brief in State v. David 
Young, Case No. 890424. A different standard of review governs 
where an issue is not preserved at trial, even in capital cases. 
In the remaining errors it chooses to address, the State 
continues to attempt to minimize each individual error and to attack 
Mr. Menzies for not reconstructing the record.13 The State does not 
deny that most of these errors exist and does not directly address 
Mr. Menzies' argument in this part that where errors of this 
significance and numerosity exist, the accuracy of the transcript 
cannot be established. 
13. Contrary to the State's assertions, Mr. Menzies has stipulated 
to a number of changes it refers to in its brief, including 
"archive" and "Rorschach" test. State's brief at 29. These errors 
are nevertheless indicative of Ms. Lee's inability to accurately 
take down what is said in court. 
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Regardless of which party has the burden, the extensive 
number of errors and inaccuracies in this transcript establish that 
it cannot be used as the official record in this appeal. 
C. NO SHOWING OF SPECIFIC PREJUDICE IS REQUIRED 
IN A CAPITAL HOMICIDE CASE WHERE AN ACCURATE 
TRANSCRIPT DOES NOT EXIST. 
In his opening brief at 36-8, Mr. Menzies argues that where 
an accurate transcript does not exist in a death penalty case, no 
showing of specific prejudice is required to set aside a capital 
homicide conviction and sentence. 
Mr. Menzies cites a number of cases for this proposition, 
including Dunn v. State, 733 S.W.2d 212, 213, 214 n.5 (Tex. Cr. App. 
1987); Little v. State, 97 S.W.2d 479, 180 (Tex. Cr. App. 1936); 
Van White v. State, 752 P.2d 814 (Okl. Cr. 1988); Kelly v. State, 
692 P.2d 563, 565 (Okl. Cr. 1984) (Brett, J., concurring); DeLap v. 
State, 350 So.2d 462 (Fla. 1977). State v. Sanders, 321 S.E.2d 836, 
837 (N.C. 1984) (per curiam), also supports Mr. Menzies' argument. 
In its response, the State fails to acknowledge, 
distinguish or otherwise refer to any of the cases cited by 
Mr. Menzies in this subpart. Instead, the State relies on 
noncapital cases (including the misdemeanor case of Mayer v. 
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971)) for the proposition that 
"[alternative methods of reporting trial proceedings are 
permissible . . . ." State's brief at 30. In a capital homicide 
case which must be reviewed for plain erorr, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-206 and the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the federal 
constitution require an accurate, verbatim transcript of proceedings. 
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POINT III. MR. MENZIES WOULD SUFFER PREJUDICE 
FROM THE USE OF EITHER VERSION OF THE TRANSCRIPT. 
Mr. Menzies included this point in his opening brief as an 
alternative argument in the event that this Court were to disagree 
with his position in Point II.C of his opening brief and were to 
require a showing of specific prejudice. He continues to maintain 
that he need not show specific harm since (1) neither Ms. Lee nor 
the notereader who prepared the original version were certified, and 
(2) the transcript is significantly inaccurate. 
In attempting to minimize the significance of the errors in 
this transcript, the State makes a circular argument, relying on 
other disputed portions of the transcript to support its arguments. 
The State also acknowledges that certain portions of the transcript 
are erroneous, then offers its interpretation of what occurred. 
Such an approach points out the difficulty of using this transcript 
in a case of this magnitude; as the appeals progress and the parties 
encounter unreliable portions of the transcript, each party will be 
left to argue to this Court its version of what was really said. 
Such an approach is unacceptable in a case of this size and severity. 
In addition, without addressing the substance of the issues 
raised by Mr. Menzies, or the overall impact of using a wholly 
unreliable transcript, the State claims that none of the numerous 
errors in this transcript matter. 
Contrary to the State7s claims, Ms. Lee's failure to 
accurately record the proceedings affects a number of issues in this 
case; the State's argument, taken to its logical extreme, suggests 
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that nothing of significance occurred during this six-week trial. 
The evidence in this case establishes that Ms. Lee failed 
to record all of the voir dire questioning and failed to accurately 
record that which she did take down. Failure to record voir dire is 
reversible error. See Taylor, 664 P.2d 439. 
The repeated inaccuracy of numbers throughout the 
transcripts demonstrates that no number, even where the notereader 
and Ms. Lee agree, is reliable. Numbers are significant in this 
case in regard to dates of occurrences; distance at which a man 
believed to be the perpetrator of this crime was viewed; the amount 
of money and cigarettes, if any, missing from the Gas-A-Mat14; rules 
and statutes relied upon; and a number of other areas. The State's 
assertion that the numbers can be corrected by looking at the 
context fails to consider the inaccuracy of the remainder of the 
transcript, the importance of inconsistencies in testimony, or the 
amount of time and difficulty already encountered in an attempt to 
fix these transcripts. 
Additional errors in this transcript prejudice 
Mr. Menzies. For example, one of the appellate issues in this case 
14. For example, the testimony regarding how many packs of 
cigarettes and how much money were missing varied. Employees of 
Gas-A-Mat initially determined that a larger number of each was 
missing and so informed the media. After the media released the 
numbers, Gas-A-Mat revised them significantly. These discrepancies 
were important in three areas: (1) whether the State could 
establish that anything was missing in support of its robbery 
theory, and (2) whether Britton had obtained his information from 
the media rather than from an admission by Mr. Menzies, and 
(3) whether the money found in the umbrella could be linked to the 
Gas-A-Mat. 
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relates to the fainting of a juror during the medical testimony. 
See footnote 12 supra at 19. Ms. Lee's transcript does not reflect 
the incident as recalled by persons who were present. T. 1622; 
R. 1932:74-5. After the juror is removed, nothing occurs in the 
transcript regarding the incident and the parties immediately pursue 
an unrelated argument; the transcript does not reveal whether the 
jury was removed, a recess was taken, or any record of the incident 
was made by defense counsel. Furthermore, shortly after the juror 
fainted in the midst of an unrelated discussion, the court stated: 
What particularly happened during the jurors— 
during the course of the trial. Rick would be a 
little more subtle or sophisticated. 
T. 1624. The occurrences surrounding the fainting of the juror 
directly affect this appeal and are not adequately recorded. 
Significant errors occur throughout this transcript which 
cause prejudice to Mr. Menzies. 
POINT IV. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW MR. MENZIES' 
CLAIMS UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTION. 
Mr. Menzies has outlined a distinct analysis under 
article 1, sections 9, 10 and 12 and article VIII, section 5 of the 
Utah Constitution. His argument is that the failure to provide an 
adequate transcript for meaningful appellate review reaches 
constitutional proportions under the Utah Constitution. See 
Appellant's opening brief at 45-7. Mr. Menzies raised and argued 
this issue in the trial court. R. 1223-5, 1237-49, 1630-2. 
POINT V. REMOVING THE PROSECUTOR'S STATEMENTS 
DOES NOT REMOVE THE PREJUDICE CAUSED BY THE 
REMARKS. 
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In a hearing held in this Court on January 2, 1990, 
appellate counsel for the State explicitly outlined the details 
contained in the prosecutor's ex parte statement. Since the State 
has informed this Court of the details of the statement, the 
statement itself is highly unusual and improper, and the statement 
reflects on the lack of integrity and qualification of Ms. Lee, it 
is appropriate to keep the remarks in the record even though they 
are not part of the "official record11 of trial proceedings in this 
case. Mr. Menzies continues to maintain that a statement of this 
nature made by the State and included in the transcript violates his 
right to due process, equal protection and appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Menzies respectfully 
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to 
the trial court for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this *%D day of May, 1991. 
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I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the 
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State 
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and four copies to the Attorney 
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
this ZO day of May, 1991. 
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JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED by this day 
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ADDENDUM A 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS 
230 SOUTH 500 EAST. SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84102 
(801)533 6371 
GORDON R. HALL 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
CHAIRMAN. JUDICIAL COUNCIL 
WILLIAM C. VICKREY 
STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR 
RONALD W. GIBSON 
DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR 
JOHN F. MCNAMARA 
JUVENILE COURT 
ADMINISTRATOR 
Hay 11, 1988 
Mr. Jim Campbell 
Deputy Clerk 
Court of Appeals, First District 
State of California 
State Building 
San Francisco, California 94102 
Dear Mr. Campbell: 
I have been provided a copy of the order entered by the 
First Appellate District of the Court of Appeals in the cases of 
Golden Oak Enterprisesf Inc.. et al vs. Manor Development Co.P Inc.f 
et al. No. 123722, and, Cindy Lee Bebbring vs. Jess Eugene Hebbingf 
No. 48395, wherein the Court of Appeals declared Tauni Byrd not to 
be competent to act as an official reporter in the State of 
California. 
Ms. Byrd is currently serving as an official reporter in a 
District Court in Utah. As the employing entity, it is important 
that we learn of the basis for the determination of incompetency if 
possible. It would be most helpful if you could provide us with as 
specific information as is available clarifying whether the 
determination was due to the quality of transcripts, failure to 
provide transcripts timely, personnel issues or some other basis. 
Any assistance which you can provide to us in this matter 
will be greatly appreciated. 
Ronald W. Gibson 
Deputy Court Administrator 
cc: Judge Raymond Uno 
Tauni Byrd 
Donald Jones 
Division of Registration 
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ADDENDUM B 
STATE OF UTAH 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS 
230 SOUTH 500 EAST. SUITE 300 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84102 
(801)533-6371 
GORDON R. HALL 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
CHAIRMAN, JUDICIAL COUNCIL 
WILL1AM C. V1CKREY 
STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR 
M E M O R A N D U M 
TO: 
From:' 
Chief Justice Gordon R. Hall 
Presiding Judge Scott Daniels 
District Judge Raymond Uno 
Court Reporter Tauni (Byrd) Lee 
ident, USRA, Donald Jones 
ibson 
Re: Official Court Reporter Tauni Lee 
RONALD W. GIBSON 
DEPUTY COURT ADMINISTRATOR 
JOHN F. MCNAMARA 
JUVENILE COURT 
ADMINISTRATOR 
For the purpose of keeping you fully advised of developments 
in the matter of Official Court Reporter Tauni Lee, I relate to you 
the following events. 
On Monday, May 23, 1988, Ms. Lee contacted me by telephone 
and informed me that she had suffered a broken finger during the 
preceding weekend while practicing karate with her husband. As a 
result of the accident, Ms. Lee indicated that the treating doctor 
placed the finger in a splint which would remain in place for 3 
weeks. Therefore, she would be unable to perform her duties as 
official court reporter during that period. 
I placed Ms. Lee on sick leave from May 23, 1988 thru June 
10, 1988. She indicated that the disability would not interfere 
with her ability to continue preparation of the transcript in the 
case of The State of Utah vs. Ralph Lerov Menziesf and that she 
would continue to meet the time schedule described in my memorandum 
of May 17, 1988. I reaffirm my prior statement that our arrangement 
for leave with pay did not constitute an extention of time for 
preparation of the transcript which lies solely within the authority 
of the Supreme Court. 
Subsequently, Mrs. Geraldine Court, 3rd District Court 
secretary, reported that she had exhausted every means of obtaining 
substitute court reporting services to serve during this period in 
Judge Uno's court, both from other officials within the court and 
all freelance private reporters, without success. 
In order to resolve this matter and assure that Judge Uno's 
court continues to function without interruption for lack of an 
official reporter, I have entered into an agreement with Ms. Viki 
Hatton of Associated Professional Reporters to provide reporting 
page 2 
May 24, 1988 
services during the entire period of absence of Ms. Lee. Our 
agreement provides that in consideration for the firm's commitment 
to provide the services we will pay the standard per diem for all 
days of the period regardless of whether the court conducts hearings 
and the services are rendered or not. The firm has assigned Mr. Ken 
Allen to this responsibility who is certified in the State of Idaho 
and has taken the certification test in Utah with the test results 
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